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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ernesto Garza Lopez appeals from the judgment entered upon the
summary dismissal of his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

On

appeal, Lopez argues the district court erred by striking his pro se motion for an
enlargement of time to respond to the court's notice of intent to dismiss.

Statement of Facts and Course of Underlying Criminal and Initial PostConviction Proceedings
In 2006, Lopez pled guilty to felony domestic battery.

(R., p.36.) The

district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with six years fixed. (R.,
p.36.) Lopez filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district
court denied. (R., p.36.) The denial of Lopez's Rule 35 motion was affirmed on
appeal.

(R., p.36.); State v. Lopez, Docket No. 33362, 2007 Unpublished

Opinion No. 556 (Idaho App., Aug. 17,2007).
On July 10, 2007, Lopez filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
alleging, inter alia, that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary,
and that trial counsel was ineffective for coercing his plea. (#37206 R., pp.4-9.)
The district court appointed post-conviction counsel, who thereafter requested
and received an extension of time to obtain relevant transcripts and file an
amended petition. (#37206 R., pp.22-31.) Several months after the transcripts
were filed, appointed counsel advised the court she would not be filing an
amended petition because she believed Lopez's original pro se petition was
untimely. (#37206 R., pp.30-47, 57-58; see also #37206 Tr. of 12/18/08, p.1,
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Ls.14-20.) The state thereafter answered the petition and moved for summary
dismissal. (#37206 R., pp.60-63, 72-73.)
At a hearing on February 20, 2009, the parties agreed, and the district
court found, that Lopez's petition was timely filed. (#37206 Tr. of 2/20109, p.10,
L.13 - p.11, L.4.) The court continued the matter for a hearing on the state's
motion for summary dismissal (#37206 Tr. of 2/20109, p.11, Ls.5-24) but, before
the hearing, Lopez filed a Bar complaint against his appointed counsel (#37206
Tr. of 4/20109, p.13, Ls.9-20). The district court permitted counsel to withdraw
and appointed Lopez a new attorney. (#37206 Tr. of 4/20109, p.13, L.13 - p.14,
L.2; #37206 R., pp.104-05.) The new attorney subsequently withdrew and, on
August 4, 2009, the court appointed a third (and final) attorney to represent
Lopez in the post-conviction proceedings. (#37206 R., pp.114-17; #37206 Tr. of
8/4/09, p.3, Ls.4-9.)

On September 18, 2009, the court held a hearing on the state's motion for
summary dismissal, at which Lopez's appointed counsel appeared and argued.
(#37206 R., pp.118-19; see generally #37206 Tr. of 9/18/09.)

Following the

hearing, the district court granted the state's motion and summarily dismissed
Lopez's post-conviction petition.
affirmed on appeal.

(#37206 R., pp.138-50.)

The dismissal was

Lopez v. State, Docket No. 37206, 2011 Unpublished

Opinion No. 383 (Idaho App., March 11,2011) (Remittitur filed June 1, 2011).

Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings
On March 26, 2012, Lopez filed a pro se successive petition for postconviction relief, and an affidavit in support thereof, essentially reasserting two of
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the claims that were contained in his original petition. (R., pp.2-10.) Specifically,
the successive petition alleged: (1) Lopez's "guilty plea was accepted by the
court in violation of the federal and state due process requirement that it be
intelligently, knowing and voluntary" (R., p.3), and (2) "Trial counsel was
ineffective in his representation when he failed to present to the court the
sentencing agreement that influenced him to plead guilty" (R., p.4). Lopez also
filed a pro se "Motion For Leave To File A Successive Petition," asserting "postconviction counsel's negligence in failing to discern his invalid guilty plea [was]
sufficient reason" for bringing a successive petition. (R., pp.11-15.)
On April 11 ,2012, the district court entered an order appointing counsel to
represent Lopez on the successive petition. (R., pp.29-31.) On April 16, 2012,
the court issued a notice of intent to summarily dismiss Lopez's successive postconviction petition as being both untimely and an improper successive petition.
(R., pp.35-43.)

The court gave Lopez 20 days in which to respond to the

proposed dismissal. (R., p.42.)
Twenty-three days later, on May 9,2012, Lopez, filed a pro se "Motion For
Enlargement Of Time To Respond To Notice Of Intent To Dismiss Application
For Post-Conviction Relief.,,1

(R., pp.47-48.) In the body of the motion, Lopez

sought an "enlargement of time to respond pro se" to the court's notice of intent

1 The "Certification" attached to Lopez's motion indicates he "tender[ed]
the motion to the Idaho Correctional Center for mailing on May 7, 2012. (R.,
p.48.) Assuming application of the "mailbox rule," the motion would be deemed
to have been filed on that date. £lL., Munson v. State, 12& Idaho 639, 642, 917
P.2d 796,799 (1996) (under "mailbox rule," pleadings filed by prose inmates are
deemed filed on the date they are delivered to prison officials for filing).
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to dismiss.

(R., p.47.)

As the basis for his request, Lopez stated: "Court

appointed counsel's shortcomings has [sic] compelied Petitioner to ask this Court
for meaningful opportunity to provide legal authority and facts that demonstrate
the existence of a genuine factual issue."

(R., p.47.)

Lopez also filed a

supporting affidavit in which he made the following representations:
2.
Court appointed counsel ... has been negligent as a servant
of this court, and failed to communicate with Petitioner regarding
this Court's intent to dismiss the application for post-conviction
relief.
3.
Pursuant to the "mailbox" rule for prisoners, affiant's motion
to respond pro se has been filed with this court on the date of
certification.
4.
Affiant further makes this court aware that there will be a
request for substitute counsel.
5.

Affiant has made his request for good cause.

6.
That affiant's interest has merit and for equitable concerns
affiant should be allowed to pro se be given an opportunity to
respond.
7.
That to affiant's knowledge court appointed [counsel) has
done nothing to protect collateral benefits.
(R., pp.44-45.)
On May 18, 2012, the district court entered an order striking Lopez's pro
se filings and summarily dismissing his successive petition.

(R., pp.49-52.)

Regarding Lopez's pro se motion and affidavit, the court reasoned:
Petitioner's pro se motion for enlargement of time asserts that it
was filed because his appointed counsel had taken no action to
Petitioner's
address the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss.
affidavit contains no facts, authority or good cause challenging the
Court's determination that his claims for relief are: 1) barred by the
statute of limitations; and, 2) that his petition is barred by I.C. § 194908.
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Petitioner is now, and was at the time of the filing of the pro
se motion, pursuant to his own request, represented by court
appointed counsel. The Court, therefore, will order Petitioner's pro
se motion and supporting affidavit, stricken.
(R., p.50.) Noting that 31 days had elapsed since the court issued its notice of
intent to summarily dismiss and that "no response thereto has been filed," the
district court summarily dismissed the successive petition for the reasons
articulated in the notice of intent to dismiss. (R., p.50.) The court subsequently
entered a judgment of dismissal, from which Lopez timely appealed. (R., pp.7983.)
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ISSUES
Lopez states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err by striking Mr. Lopez's pro se motion
instead of addressing his request for new counselor to proceed pro
se and additional time to respond to the court's notice of intent to
dismiss?
2.
Does the district court's error in failing to provide Mr. Lopez
with a meaningful opportunity to respond to the Notice of Intent to
dismiss require remand for appointment of counsel and an
opportunity to respond to the district court's notice?
(Appellant's brief, p.?)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Lopez failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion by striking his pro se motion for an extension of time and affidavit in
support thereof because, at the time of the pro se filings, Lopez was represented
by counsel?
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ARGUMENT
Lopez Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Striking His Pro Se Filings
A.

Introduction
Lopez argues the district court erred by striking his pro se motion for an

enlargement of time to respond to the court's notice of intent to summarily
dismiss his successive post-conviction petition.

(Appellant's brief, pp.7-11.)

Lopez's argument fails. Because Lopez was represented by counsel, the district
court had authority under Rule 11 (a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to
strike any motion or pleading not signed by Lopez's legal representative. Even if
Rule 11 (a)(1) did not grant the court such authority, a review of the record and of
the applicable law shows the district court acted within its inherent discretion in
striking Lopez's pro se filings because Lopez was represented by counsel.

B.

Standards Of Review
"The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of law

over which this Court has free review." Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 734, 228
P.3d

998,

1001

(2010)

(citing Canyon

County Bd.

Of Equalization v.

Amalgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58, 60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006).
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the
lower court acted within the bounds of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the
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lower reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Eby, 148 Idaho at 734, 228
P.3d at 1001: State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 742,743,202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct.
App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333
(1989)).

C.

The District Court Had Authority Under Rule 11 (a)(1) Of The Idaho Rules
Of Civil Procedure To Strike Any Motion Or Pleading Not Signed By
Lopez's Legal Representative
Although Idaho's appellate courts have never before issued a published

opinion addressing the authority of a trial court to strike the pro se pleadings of a
litigant represented by counsel,2 that authority appears to derive, at least in part,
from Rule 11 (a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule governs the
"signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers" in civil cases and provides, in
relevant part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1)
licensed attorney of record of the state of Idaho, in the attorney's
individual name, whose address shall be stated before the same
may be filed. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the party's
address. ... If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. ...
I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1). Pursuant to the plain language of this rule, any motion filed by

2 The state notes the Idaho Court of Appeals has, in an unpublished opinion,
upheld a trial court's decision to strike the pro se filings of a represented postconviction petitioner on the basis that "it was within the discretion of the trial court
to require all documents to be filed by [the petitioner's] legal representative."
See State v. Johnson, 2012 WL 9490829, *2 (Idaho App., Feb. 3, 2012)
(unpublished opinion). The state recognizes that, because it is unpublished, the
Johnson opinion is not precedent and is in no way binding on this Court.
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a represented party must be signed by the party's attorney of record. Where the
pleading or motion is not signed, the court is authorized by Rule 11 (a)(1) to strike
it.

Lopez acknowledges Rule 11 (a)(1) but argues the provision of that rule
authorizing a court to strike unsigned pleadings does not apply in this case
because Lopez signed his motion for enlargement of time.
p.7.)

(Appellant's brief,

Application of well settled principles of statutory interpretation shows,

however, that Lopez's reading of the rule is too narrow.
It is a fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation that statutes - and, by
analogy, court rules - must be interpreted so that effect is given to their every
word and clause. State v. Baer, 132 Idaho 416,417-18,973 P.3d 768, 769-70
(Ct. App. 1999). The interpretation of a statute or court rule must begin with its
literal words. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003).
Those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the
statute or rule must be construed as a whole.

lit

Construing Rule 11 (a)(1) as a whole, it is apparent that the rule authorizes
a trial court to strike the pro se pleadings and motions of parties represented by
counsel. The rule expressly authorizes a trial court to strike pleadings, motions
or other papers that are "not signed." I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1). While the term "signed"
is not explicitly defined, it is clear from the context in which that term is used that
it means "signed" as provided for in the rule. Pursuant to the express language
of the rule, "[e]very pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one (1) licensed attorney of record of the
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state of Idaho, in the attorney's individual name."

id. Only "[a] party who is not

represented by an attorney" is permitted to "sign the pleading, motion or other
paper" in the party's own name. Id. Giving effect to every word and clause of
the rule - as this Court must - there can be little doubt that a pleading, motion or
other paper that is signed by a party in his or her individual capacity, while that
party is represented by legal counsel, is not "signed" within the meaning of the
rule and may therefore be stricken by the trial court.
In this case, it is beyond dispute that Lopez filed his pro se motion for an
enlargement of time after counsel was appointed to represent him. Because the
motion was signed by Lopez, and not his appointed legal representative, the
motion was effectively unsigned and the district court had authority under
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) to strike it.

D.

The District Court Acted Within Its Inherent Discretion In Striking Lopez's
Pro Se Motion For An Enlargement Of Time
Even assuming I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1) did not grant the court authority to strike

Lopez's pro se filings, a review of cases from other jurisdictions shows the court
had inherent discretion to do so. As even Lopez acknowledges on appeal (see
Appellant's brief, p.7 (and cases cited therein)), the general rule among other
jurisdictions is that a trial court is not required to acknowledge the pro se filings
of a litigant - be it a criminal defendant or a post-conviction petitioner - who is
represented by an attorney.
1027, 1030 (9

th

See, SUL, United States v. Bergman, 813 F.2d

Cir. 1987) (upholding trial court's refusal to acknowledge

represented defendant's pro se filings); United States v. Jones, 832 F.Supp.2d
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519,533 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (trial court not obligated to consider defendant's pro se
motion to set aside plea while defendant was represented by counsel);
Commonwealth v. Padilla, _

A.3d _ , 2013 WL 5848693, *27 (Pa. 2013)

(criminal defendant not entitled to hybrid representation and, therefore, trial court
did not err by declining to consider represented defendant's pro se motions on
the merits); State v. Hall, 294 P.3d 632, 639 n.8 (Ut. App. 2013) ("When a
defendant is represented by counsel, he generally has no authority to file pro se
motions and the court should not consider them." (internal quotations and
citations omitted»; People v. Milton, 820 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (III. App. 2004)
(generally, trial court may not consider pro se motions filed by a defendant who
is represented by counsel); In re Barnett, 73 P.3d 1106, 1110 (Cal. 2003) ("As a
general rule, parties who are represented in court by counsel of record are
required to proceed in court through their counsel."); Commonwealth v. Pursell,
724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999) (court considering post-conviction petition not required
to "struggle through the pro se filings" of petitioner who was represented by
counsel); State v. Hurt, 931 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Mo. App. 1996) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to consider defendant's pro se motion for a
continuance filed while defendant was represented by counsel).
An exception to the general rule that permits a trial court to ignore the pro
se filings of a represented party apparently exists when the pro se filing is
directed at matters concerning the representation.

See,~,

Barnett, 73 P.3d at

1110 n.2 (defendants represented by counsel "may make pro se motions
regarding representation, including requests for self-representation and for
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sUbstitution of counsel" (internal citations omitted)); Milton, 820 N.E.2d at 1081
("represented defendants are allowed to raise pro se claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel so long as they include supporting facts and specific
claims"); Sheppard v. State, 17 SO.3d 275, 286-87 (Fla. 2009) (trial court
required to consider represented defendant's pro se motion to withdraw plea
where motion alleges adversarial relationship such as counsel's misadvice,
misrepresentation, or coercion that led to the entry of the plea).

Contrary to

Lopez's assertions on appeal, a review of his pro se filings shows the general
rule, not the exception, applies in this case.
Lopez's pro se motion was both in form and substance a motion for
additional time to respond to the court's notice of intent to summarily dismiss his
successive post-conviction petition.

The motion was specifically captioned a

"Motion For Enlargement Of Time To Respond To Notice Of Intent To Dismiss
Application For Post-Conviction Relief." (R., pA7.) Likewise, the body of the
motion sought an "enlargement of time to respond pro se, to [the] Court's intent
to summarily dismiss Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief."

(R.,

pA7.) It is true Lopez also alleged in his pro se motion and affidavit that he felt
compelled by his appointed counsel's "shortcomings" to request additional time
to respond pro se to the court's notice of intent to dismiss. (See R., pp.45, 47.)
But, contrary to Lopez's assertions on appeal, Lopez never requested in either
the motion or affidavit to discharge his appointed counsel. Instead, it appears
from the motion and affidavit that Lopez sought additional time to file a pro se
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss while still represented by
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counsel (R., p.47) or, alternatively, sought additional time to file a motion for

substitute counsel at some unspecified point in the future (see R., p.45 ("Affiant
further makes this court aware that there will be a request for substitute counsel."
(Emphasis added).) Either way, the motion was a request for additional time, not
a request to discharge counsel and, as such, the district court acted within its
discretion in declining to consider it.
In an effort to demonstrate error in the trial court's decision to strike his
pro se filings, Lopez appears to argue he was not actually represented by an

attorney at the time he filed his motion. (See Appellant's brief, p.9 ("[A]lthough
nominally represented, no attorney had been assigned to Mr. Lopez at the time
the district court struck his request for time and dismissed his case.").)

To

support this assertion, Lopez posits that, due to the relative proximity of the
court's order appointing counsel to the issuance of its notice of intent to dismiss,
"the public defender did not have the opportunity to assign conflict counsel"
before the time for responding to the notice of intent to dismiss expired. (Id.) To
the extent this assertion is a challenge to the district court's factual finding that
Lopez was represented by counsel when he filed his pro se motion for
enlargement of time, Lopez has failed to carry his appellate burden of
demonstrating clear error.

See,~,

Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, _ , 294

P.3d 197, 199 (Ct. App. 2012) (appellate court will not disturb lower court's
factual findings unless the findings are clearly erroneous). The record shows the
court appointed counsel to represent Lopez almost a full month before Lopez
filed his pro se motion. (R., pp.29, 47.) That counsel did not file any documents
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on behalf of Lopez during that one-month period does not establish that Lopez
was unrepresented. Lopez's assertions to the contrary are nothing more than
bare speculation and fail to show clear error.
Lopez next argues the district court was obligated to consider his pro se
motion for enlargement of time because Lopez effectively alleged in the motion
that his appointed counsel was ineffective.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-11.)

To

support his argument, Lopez relies primarily on the reasoning of Graves v. State,
642 SO.2d 142 (Fla. App. 1994). Graves is inapposite, however, because in that
case the defendant actually filed a pro se motion to discharge his appointed
attorney on the basis that the attorney had been "noncommunicative, had not
devoted sufficient time to the preparation of his case, and had yet to depose any
witnesses."

kL at 142-43.

The defendant also included in his motion a "request[]

that new counsel be appointed."

kL

at 143. Under those circumstances, the

Graves court framed the issue before it as "what is the procedure which the trial
court should follow for the purpose of protecting an indigent's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in a criminal prosecution where before the commencement of the
trial the Defendant moves to discharge appointed counsel."

kL (citation,

internal

quotations, and brackets omitted). Answering that question, the Graves court,
citing its prior decision in Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1973), held
that, upon receiving a pro se motion to discharge appointed counsel on the basis
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court should not ignore the motion
merely because it was filed pro se but should instead "make a sufficient inquiry
of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is
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reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering
effective assistance to the defendant."

.kL at 143-44.

Unlike the criminal defendant in Graves -

who actually had a

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and moved in the trial
court to discharge his appointed attorney - Lopez had no such right and filed no
such motion in his successive post-conviction case. See Rios-Lopez v. State,
144 Idaho 340, 343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Follinus v.
State, 127 Idaho 897, 902-03, 908 P.2d 590, 595-96 (Ct. App. 1995) (postconviction applicant has no constitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel).

Rather, as argued above, Lopez's pro se motion was

merely a motion for an enlargement of time to file a pro se response to the
court's notice of intent to dismiss while still represented by counselor,
alternatively, to file a motion for substitute counsel at some indeterminate point in
the future. Lopez has cited no authority, and the state is not aware of any, that
would have required the court to consider what was at its core simply a pro se
motion for extension of time merely because Lopez asserted in the motion and
supporting affidavit that, to his knowledge, his appointed post-conviction counsel
had not taken any action to address the court's notice of intent to dismiss.
Because Lopez's pro se motion was simply one for an extension of time,
and not a request to discharge appointed counsel, the district court acted within
the bounds of its discretion in striking the motion because Lopez was
represented by counsel.
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E.

If The Court Erred In Striking Lopez's Pro Se Filings, Such Error Was
Harmless
Even if this Court construes Lopez's pro se filings as requesting additional

time to respond to the court's notice of intent to dismiss and as seeking to
discharge counsel and proceed pro se, any error in the trial court's decision to
strike the pro se filings is harmless.

Rule 61 of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure provides, in relevant part:
[NJo error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for ...
vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding
must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Although Lopez argues otherwise, a review of the record in this case does not
support Lopez's claim that the court's refusal to address his request to proceed
pro se (assuming such request was made) violated his substantial rights.
Lopez's pro se motion sought an enlargement of time to file a pro se
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss.

Lopez, however, filed the

motion after the 20-day response period had already elapsed, and he failed in
the motion and affidavit to set forth any grounds why more time was needed or
what information could be gathered and provided were more time granted.

In

fact, in striking Lopez's pro se filings, the district court specifically found that
Lopez's "affidavit contain[ed] no facts, authority or good cause challenging the
Court's determination that his claims for relief are: 1) barred by the statute of
limitations; and, 2) that his petition is barred by I.C. § 19-4908." (R., p.50.)

16

In light of the court's reasoning, and in light of the fact that the court struck
Lopez's pro se filings and dismissed the petition on the same day, it is clear the
court would not have granted Lopez's pro se request for additional time to
respond to the notice of intent to dismiss even had it considered it.

Nor has

Lopez argued on appeal that he was entitled to additional time beyond the 20day statutory period of I.C. § 19-4906(a) to respond to the court's notice of intent
to dismiss. 3 Having failed to demonstrate either below or on appeal that he was
entitled to a continuance, Lopez cannot show that the court's refusal to consider
his request to proceed pro se violated his substantial rights. Because Lopez was
not entitled to more time to respond before the district court dismissed his
petition, granting his motion to proceed pro se in the same order that dismissed
the case would not have changed the outcome.

Lopez devotes a substantial portion of his Appellant's brief arguing what might
have been shown had been granted additional time to respond - either pro se or
with the assistance of substitute counsel - to the court's notice of intent to
dismiss. (See Appellant's brief, pp.11-19.) None of the legal authority or facts
Lopez cites on appeal were actually presented to the district court, either in
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss or in Lopez's pro se motion
and affidavit for an enlargement of time and, as such, they are not properly
before this Court for the first time on appeal. If this Court finds the trial court
committed reversible error by striking Lopez's pro se filings, the state submits the
appropriate remedy is simply remand for consideration of those pleadings on the
merits.
3
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the summary dismissal of Lopez's successive post-conviction petition.
th

DATED this 19 day of November 2013.
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